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Vietnam: Economic Strategy and  
Economic Reality 
Adam Fforde 
Abstract: The paper examines the nature of the growing Vietnamese 
economy and its changing structural characteristics and contrasts this 
with two core elements of official thinking. The first element is the slo-
gan of ‘industrialisation and modernisation’ (IM) and how this sits with 
the rather fast current growth in the services sectors, given the issues of 
transitioning through the recently reached ‘middle income status’. The 
second is that of “a socialist-oriented market economy” (SOME) with 
reference to its origins, the nature of debates around it and its positive 
and negative implications for Vietnam’s development. Our basic conclu-
sions are that IM is misplaced, as it ignores services and is out-of-date, 
and the SOME has largely been a somewhat confused and transparent 
fig-leaf for support for essentially private commercial interests associated 
with certain state conglomerates. Recent changes around the 2016 XIIth 
Congress suggest that lessons are being learned by some elements in the 
Party.  
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Introduction 
Between its VIIth and XIIth Party Congresses (1991 and 2016), Vietnam 
clearly experienced some major changes. Whether the country ‘really 
changed’ is the stuff of poetry and a familiar part of the discussions of 
any political community about what has happened and so what might 
happen. A core part of this, again in a quite familiar way, are arguments 
about causality – to what or whom can authorship of these changes be 
ascribed – and which arguments are deemed good and which are not. 
This paper1 engages with such deliberations by contrasting an examina-
tion of some empirics with how the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 
has publicly characterised change, and its role within change as a central 
author. The former uses the standard measures of economic growth, as 
presented in the National Income Accounts, based on standard methods 
that were introduced in the early 1990s as Soviet methods of measuring 
levels of economic activity were discarded. The latter uses two core slo-
gans: ‘industrialisation and modernisation’, or IM (Công nghip hóa - hin 
i hóa); and a ‘socialist-oriented market economy’, or SOME (Kinh t th 
trng nh h	ng xã h
i ch ngha). I tend to agree with Gainsborough’s 
seminal 2007 article, which argued that, by that time, CPV politics had 
little to do with policy because discussions posed in those terms were the 
clothes of factional rivalries.2 However, this is an academic study and 
whilst Pew surveys suggests that the Vietnamese people greatly like their 
market economy, this tells us rather little about what they think has 
caused change over the past generation.3 Given the lack of political re-
form, it is difficult to solve this issue in any effective or efficient way, as 
disempowered populations cannot easily show what they really want. My 
                                                 
1  This paper draws upon a paper given at the Vietnam Forum 2016, entitled 
“Vietnam: Thirty Years Of Doi Moi And Beyond”, held April 2016 at the 
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Republic of Singapore, as well as presentations 
and discussions subsequently in May 2016 in Hanoi. I am grateful to everyone 
who commented on the paper, and to an anonymous referee.  
2  “[…] politicians in Vietnam generally do not distinguish themselves from each 
other on policy lines, although struggles for control over resources are some-
times dressed up in policy terms” (Gainsborough 2007: 20). 
3  Goertzel reports, based upon the Pew Global Attitudes Project, that: “Brazili-
ans are divided in their opinions about the market economy, with 56% in the 
Pew survey agreeing that “most people are better off in a free market economy, 
even though some people are rich and some are poor”. Only 26.7% of the Ar-
gentines shared this sentiment in the midst of their economic crisis, as com-
pared to 72.1% in the United States and a remarkable 95.4% in Vietnam, 43.6% 
in India, 54.2% in Bolivia and 62.8% in Venezuela” (Goertzel 2006: 4–5). 
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general conclusion is that the economic evidence presented strongly 
suggests that neither of the two core slogans have much credibility.  
From the VIIth to the XIIth Congresses –  
Economic Change 
The Data Tells a Story – But What Story?  
According to standard modern statistical measures, Vietnam’s economic 
performance since the emergence of a market economy has been good.4 
Figure 1 shows GDP growth and inflation. From the early 1990s growth 
clearly accelerated to just below 10 per cent annually, dipping around the 
time of the Asian Financial Crisis, but then recovering. From 2008 it 
slipped to a rather lower level. Inflation followed a similar path. The 
acceleration of GDP growth around 1992 coincided with a steep fall in 
the rate of inflation, and the slowdown around 2008 coincided with an 
acceleration of inflation, which was eventually brought back down to 
single-digit levels in 2013.  
At these rates of change, things approximately double every decade. 
In these measures, Vietnam entered so-called ‘middle income’ status 
around 2009. High rates of investment mean that the physical infrastruc-
ture usually changes greatly, and so does what people do.  
 
                                                 
4  I have not surveyed the existing literature on the Vietnamese economy, partly 
due to space limitations, partly because citations can be made to my own work, 
and also because much of the literature exhibits strong belief in industrialisation 
as an essential driver of growth, a view that the present paper challenges. Clear-
ly, a literature survey is needed, and if this paper’s core observation is taken se-
riously, we also need more research on Vietnam’s economic growth since the 
early 1990s. However, we may also be facing a paradigm shift, and experience 
suggests that in such limbic states arguments often arise to ignore, in some way, 
what appear as anomalies (Fforde 2016a) reports that there is evidence that this 
may be occurring. Fforde (2005) reported an analogous rejection, by perhaps 
three-quarters of the citations of it, of the conclusions from the application of 
robustness- testing techniques that concluded that there are almost no robust 
relationships between policy settings and growth performance globally. Similar 
trends can likely be found in arguments that, in Vietnam, manufacturing ex-
ports have been important; these arguments ignore the lack of rapid growth in 
value-added in such sectors, implying that they rely heavily upon imports of 
materials that are then inputs to the factories. Fforde (2016c) discusses the is-
sue of confirmation bias in empirical research.  
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Figure 1. GDP Growth and Inflation 
Source: GSO NGTK various years. 
This underpins a historical division of the period that I chose for analyti-
cal and expository purposes (another periodisation may offer better alter-
natives).  
From the very early 1990s until around 1997 
During this period there was a failed attempt to generate, on the back of 
a certain residual political authority at the peak of the Party, a new devel-
opment ideology and policy suited to a market economy ‘with a socialist 
orientation’. With the retirement of Vo van Kiet and Do Muoi in 1997, 
the rural unrest in Thai Binh – which showed the extent of corruption in 
the use of development resources, and combined with the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis – ended this period. During this period, factor markets (land 
and labour especially) emerged clearly and there was no clear resolution 
of the messy and informal nature of state capital.  
From around 1997 until around 2007 
This can be described as a period of political ‘laissez-faire’. It was a time 
of macroeconomic stability, the emergence in significant numbers of 
FDI and private (in the legal sense) employment, and a divorce of poli-
tics from policy. State workers ceased to have a favoured position and 
learned, like those in other sectors, that law had little significance except 
as a platform to seek to exert pressure on party and state officials – 
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courts and police had no particular interest or capacity to generate “rule 
of law” (Tran Ngoc Angie 2013). 
From around 2007 until the XIIth Congress in 2016  
Near the start of this period, Vietnam secured ‘middle-income status’. 
Around 2007, the State Bank was prevented by politicians close to cer-
tain large state owned enterprises (SOE) conglomerates from sterilising 
liquidity created by its interventions in the foreign exchange markets to 
manage large capital inflows; this led to a period of macroeconomic 
instability in which multiple exchange rates and capital costs created 
levels of rents that had not been seen since the hyperinflation of the late 
1980s. This had pervasive and destructive effects on areas such as credits 
to SMEs, levels of budget funding for rural development, funding for 
public health and education, waste in public investments, etc., which 
greatly reduced the remaining public confidence in the regime. However, 
macroeconomic stability was restored by around 2012–2013 and eco-
nomic growth recovered, albeit well below earlier levels. The period 
ended with the 2016 XIIth Congress, which saw Party power over the 
executive restored. This loss of macroeconomic stability led to the ques-
tion that Leung (2015) asked, stressing concerns over the political will to 
continue with reforms: 
[…] questions are being raised about the political will of the [Viet-
namese] government to make the needed structural reforms in 
such a way that benefit the economy rather than powerful insid-
ers. [8] 
The question that then arises – which is the focus of the present paper – 
is whether the foundational elements of development strategy, as ex-
pressed in IM and SOME, make sense.  
Tables 1 and 2 show changes in the recorded pattern of employ-
ment, which is measured, as the NIA does, in terms of employment that 
generates incomes for the three factors of production: land, labour and 
capital. 
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Table 1. Structure of Work Force, 1991 (in Thousands) 
Sector A. Numbers B. %
Industry 3,394 11.0
Construction 820 2.6
Agriculture and forestry 22,483 72.6
Transport and communications 526 1.7
Trade and supply 1,719 5.5
Other material production 30 0.1
Housing, public services and 
tourism 296 1.0 
Science, education and culture 899 2.9
Health, social insurance and sport 310 1.0
Finance, etc. 118 0.4
State management 240 0.8
Other non-material 139 0.4
TOTAL 30,974 100.0
Note:  The data is based upon Soviet statistical methodology.  
Source:  GSO 1993. 
 
The table shows a picture of a Vietnamese economy, as growth started 
to accelerate, that is strongly oriented towards agriculture; it has some 
industrialisation and a services sectors5  apparently mainly to do with 
trade, supply and communications on one hand, and public services such 
as education and health on the other. However, this picture arguably 
obscures the real economic picture; for example, by treating rural farm-
ing families, with their traditional heavy engagement in trade, as ‘agricul-
tural’. As non-Soviet Western statistical methodology is applied, we get 
the following picture (in Table 2).6  
  
                                                 
5  In this paper, by ‘services’ I mean ‘tertiary sectors’ – neither industry and min-
ing, nor agriculture forestry and fisheries.  
6  It appears that the Vietnamese GSO did not manage to sort out its employ-
ment data measured on the new basis until the end of the 1990s, later than the 
production of NIA.  
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Table 2. Structure of Employed Work Force, 2000 and 2014 (prelim, in 
Thousands) 
Sector 2000 2014 Change 
 Numbers % Numbers % Numbers 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 24,481 65.1 24,409 46.3 -72 
Mining 256 0.7 253 0.5 -3 
Manufacturing 3,550 9.4 7,415 14.1 +3,865 
Electricity, gas and water 
(*) 83 0.2 248 0.5 +165 
Construction 1,040 2.8 3,313 6.3 +2,273 
Trade and minor repairs 3,897 10.4 6,652 12.3 +2,728 
Hotels and restaurants 
(**) 685 1.8 2,301 4.4 +2,755 
Transport, storage and 
communications (***) 1,174 3.1 1,953 3.5 +779 
Financial intermediation 75 0.2 352 0.7 +277 
Science and technology 
(#) 19 0.05 251 0.5 +232 
Real estate etc. 64 0.2 158 0.3 +124 
Public administration and 
defence (2000) 376 1.0 n/i   
Administration and 
support services n/i  262 0.5  
Education and training 995 2.7 1,860 3.5 +865 
Health and social work 226 0.6 493 0.9 +267 
Recreation, culture and 
sport 132 0.4 286 0.5 +154 
Party, mass organisations 
and associations 64 0.2 n/i   
Party, mass organisations, 
defence and security n/i  1,697 3.2  
Community, social and 
private household (##) 493 1.3 175 0.3 -318 
Other service activities n/i  764 1.4  
TOTAL 37,610  52,745  +15,135 
Note:  ‘n/i’ = ‘not included’. (*) – includes air conditioning. (**) In 2000, called ‘Hotels 
and restaurants’; in 2014, the category is ‘Accommodation and food service 
activities’. (***) In 2014, I have combined ‘Transportation and Storage’ with ‘In-
formation and communication’. (#) For 2014 I have given the entry for ‘Profes-
sional, scientific and technical activities’. (##) I am not sure how this data is 
created. I thank an anonymous reviewer for arguing that many small private 
household businesses in Vietnam may be involved in manufacturing; however, 
like other arguments (such as those that seek to argue from rapid growth in 
manufactures exports to rapid growth in manufactures value-added – ignoring 
the sectoral GDP data that suggests rapid growth of imports of inputs), this 
appears as ‘anomaly-attacking’ and an attempt to defend existing doctrine in 
familiar ways. Table 3 clearly shows how developing countries have, on aver-
age, not been industrialising.  
Source:  GSO 2008: Tables 17 and 18 and GSO 2015: Tables 53 and 54. 
It is clear that this is not a picture of industrialisation. Whilst some 15 
million jobs were created between 2000 and 2014, manufacturing and 
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mining only generated about 3.9 million jobs. How is meaning given to 
such data?  
The Economic Gaze  
In the NIA system the economy is conceived of as fundamentally divid-
ed by different categories of output: primary (agriculture, forestry and 
fishing), secondary (industry which includes mining) and tertiary services. 
Like the basic economic view that sees economic activity as activities 
that generate rewards paid on markets to factors of production (rents, 
wages and salaries, profits), this conception largely reflects the economic 
development experienced by many now-rich countries up until, say, the 
1960s. There are alternatives; for example, dividing an economy by 
transaction type,7 and rewards to economic activity as including imputed 
payments for non-marketed activities such as home-based childcare. A 
host of different imagined realities follow from such decisions.  
From the Soviet Union, drawing on Marx, the core vision of how 
economic growth happens is through the expanded production of indus-
trial investment (‘capital’) goods (Group A) that drive expanded produc-
tion of the rest of the economy through increases in the capital stock, 
including in the rest of industry (Group B) (Stalin 1951).  
Western ‘production function’ approaches are now somewhat dated 
but still taught in basic development economics courses, and I believe 
they have a pervasive impact. These approaches see growth also as large-
ly based upon the accumulation of capital through investment (Fforde 
2013: chapters 7, 8). Human capital can be included without changing 
the basic metaphor greatly.  
Both of these visions can be said to have decided to view an econ-
omy as something that ‘turns stuff into stuff’, and industry as a meaning-
ful category is then constructed accordingly. The ‘factory’ offers a ready 
basis for an aggregate metaphor in which workers and technology em-
bodied in machines combine to produce industrial products, primary 
sectors such as agriculture feed them (workers and machines), and ser-
vices sectors provide certain necessary services, with what is actually 
                                                 
7  Indeed, the Vietnamese for ‘services’ – dich vu – may be glossed as those activi-
ties that enable or embody transactions (thus giao dich – transactions generally, mau 
dich – trade transactions, phien dich – translations). I find the semantics confus-
ing. Comments on this would be welcome, not least because equivalent Chi-
nese terminology appears to be different and stresses the subordinate nature of 
services, seeming to prefer the term that in Vietnamese appears as phuc vu. All 
of these Vietnamese words are of Chinese origin.  
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supplied determined in the growth process by the logic of industry. One 
can then conceive of education, health, transport, insurance, finance (and 
tourism) as serving industry.  
The languages (both English and Vietnamese) perhaps mark this – a 
servant is subordinate. Thus, we find Stalin in the early 1950s and the 
World Bank in its famous 1993 Miracle study agreeing that industrialisa-
tion is and therefore should be the core active driver of economic devel-
opment (a core label of success, ‘NIE’, stands for ‘newly industrialising 
economies’) (Stalin 1952; World Bank 1993). Indeed, Stalin and the 
World Bank agree that the core issue in terms of state action is how this 
will be made to happen, though the answers are very different. Both 
agree that the author of development is the state: for Stalin, a hyper-
active and hyper-intrusive one; for the World Bank, a technocratic-
guided and market-friendly one that deals with market failure, does not 
intervene in ways that create or exacerbate market failures, and provides 
a stable political environment (Stalin would have agreed with this). Both 
the World Bank and the Soviet Union presented such visions as relative-
ly universal. 
There are two core problems with such approaches. The first is that 
there are statistically almost no robust relations between policy and eco-
nomic performance viewed globally; that is, in terms of categories such 
as “export-oriented industrialisation” (Fforde 2005; Levine and Zervos 
1993). This means at the least that the data does not support any single 
vision of what economic development is, or how it can be done. This 
can be taken to imply that economic statistics do not have stable refer-
ents globally: GDP is essentially a different thing in different places.  
The second problem is that, according to the data, neither Vietnam 
(as we have seen) nor indeed most other developing countries have, been 
‘industrialising’ in the historical period covered here (from the VIIth to 
the XIIth Congresses). In fact, these countries have been servicising (see 
Table 3 below), and the countries that have grown faster tend to have 
been servicising more (Fforde 2016a). A lot more research is needed, but 
this pattern does not mean that, with such fast rates of growth people 
are moving from poorly paid agricultural jobs to poorly paid service jobs. 
With rapid growth in GDP, service jobs must generate enough added 
value to allow such large services sectors compared with GDP to be part 
of rapid growth outcomes. Table 3 shows the global picture.  
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Table 3. Structural Change in Developing Countries’ Economies, 1991–2013 
 Percentages 
of countries 
Change in the measured share of 
GDP in the whole economy 
  A. Services B. Industry 
Group 1 (less than 
100% growth) 25% +2.1% +0.6% 
Group 2 (100–200% 
growth) 48% +6.5% +1.4% 
Group 3 (200–300% 
growth) 15% +7.5% -0.7% 
Group 4 (more than 
300% growth) 10% +10.8% +0.1% 
All countries  +6.2% +0.5% 
Note:  Averages are unweighted; data is for individual countries. Growth defined as 
change in current PPP US dollars.  
Source:  World Bank n.y. 
For Vietnam, the service GDP share rose from 38 per cent in 1992 to 43 
per cent in 2013. In addition, whilst the share of the broad category 
‘industry’ over the same period rose from 23 per cent to 29 per cent, this 
growth was largely due to increased mining output. In 2013 mining – 
included in the industry statistical definition – was 12 per cent of GDP 
yet below 5 per cent in the early 1990s; this means that the non-mining 
‘industry’ share of GDP fell from around 18 per cent in the early 1990s 
to around 17 per cent in 2013 (GSO 1993: Table 18 and GSO 2014: 
Tables 66 and 68). If one cares not to believe this data then the point to 
bear in mind is that it is the public face of quantified economic change. 
If someone makes a speech implying that successful ‘industrialisation’ 
was the core, central driver of change, then that person must either argue 
that the fall in agriculture’s share and the rise of services’ share were 
dependent upon industry, likely avoiding the issue that industry only 
grows as a share of GDP if you include mining, or find some other way 
to argue the point.  
Table 4 shows data on added value (sum of wages, profits and rents) 
provided by the GSO for the same classification.8 Further analysis is on-
going, but if we think of this as a snap-shot of a ‘disequilibrium’, with 
factors of production guided by market and other signals, then this does 
not suggest that manufacturing is a ‘low point’ into which resources will 
flood. Rather, it is rather similar to sectors such as ‘trade and minor re-
pairs’, ‘construction’ and ‘hotels’, in which large employment gains are 
                                                 
8  I have not yet attempted to match the value-added data with data on average 
wages in these various sectors.  
  Vietnam: Economic Strategy and Economic Reality 13
 

 
occurring and where the amount of value added per capita is well above 
that of agriculture. The significant ‘low points’ (leaving aside mining) are 
‘electricity, gas and water’ (which includes air conditioning), ‘financial 
intermediation’ and ‘real estate’. Note that the mass public services (edu-
cation and health) are poor, but keeping up, and that as labour pours out 
of farming per capita, value-added there has kept up quite well to the 
national average.  
Table 4. Value-Added (‘Productivity’) of Employed Work Force, 2000 and 
2014 (prelim) (in million VND ng per person) 
Sector 2000 2014 Change  
 VND VND A. Ratio B. Rank 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 4.4 28.6 x 6.5 2 
Mining 166.6 1,683.3 x 10.1 1 
Manufacturing 23.1 70.0 x 3.0 10 
Electricity, gas and water (*) 169.2 652.2 x 3.8 6 
Construction 22.7 60.7 x 2.7 11 
Trade and minor repairs 16.1 58.3 x 3.6 7 
Hotels and restaurants (**) 20.9 64.2 x 3.1 9 
Transport, storage and 
communications (***) 14.8 75.2 x 5.1 3 = 
Financial intermediation 108.4 352.1 x 3.3 8 
Science and technology (#) 124.7 204.2 x 1.6 12 
Real estate, etc. 300.0 1,278.6 x 4.3 4 = 
Public administration and 
defence (2000) 32.1 n/i   
Administration and support 
services (2014) n/i 262.1   
Education and training 14.9 64.9 x 4.3 4 = 
Health and social work 26.6 134.4 x 5.1 3 = 
Recreation, culture and sport 19.4 80.7 x 4.2 5 
Party, mass organisations 
and associations (2000) 9.6 n/i   
Party, mass organisations, 
defence and security n/i 62.5   
Community, social and 
private household (##) 21.9 32.9 x 1.5 13 
Other service activities n/i 85.6   
TOTAL (whole economy) 11.7 74.7 x 6.4  
Note:  ‘n/i’ = ‘not included’. (*) – includes air conditioning. (**) In 2000, called ‘Hotels 
and restaurants’; in 2014, category is ‘Accommodation and food service activi-
ties’. (***) In 2014, I have combined ‘Transportation and storage’ with ‘Infor-
mation and communication’. (#) For 2014 I have given the entry for ‘Profes-
sional, scientific and technical activities’. (##) I am not sure how this data was 
created.  
Source:  GSO 2008: Tables 17 and 23 and GSO 2015: Tables 53, 54 and 62. 
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It is striking that the ‘industrialisation’ story has had a long life. World 
Bank teaching texts that are currently valid (that is, on their website), 
such as World Bank and Soubbbotina (2000), argue that:  
Everything that grows also changes its structure. Just as a growing 
tree constantly changes the shape, size, and configuration of its 
branches, a growing economy changes the proportions and inter-
relations among its basic sectors—agriculture, industry, and ser-
vices and between other sectors—rural and urban, public and pri-
vate, domestic- and export-oriented. […] Are there common pat-
terns in how growing economies change? 
As income per capita rises, agriculture loses its primacy, giving 
way first to a rise in the industrial sector, then to a rise in the ser-
vice sector. These two consecutive shifts are called industrializa-
tion and postindustrialization (or “deindustrialization”). All growing 
economies are likely to go through these stages. (50–51; emphasis added) 
It would be interesting to study such beliefs, which clearly, and without 
any real sense of the analytical choices being made, use organic meta-
phors that apparently have a very long history (Nisbet 1969; Fforde 
2016a).  
However, recent World Bank World Development Reports from this 
decade make little mention of industrialisation per se. Compare the fol-
lowing, from the 2009 WDR:  
Industrialization brings with it a rapid process of urbanization— 
new cities are born, and existing cities expand. As people crowd 
into these cities at a faster rate than their boundaries expand, pop-
ulation and economic density increase. Quite early in a country’s 
development, this leads to a hierarchy of places. (WDR 2009: 57) 
It would seem that the basic ‘production’ metaphor of economic change 
(‘turning stuff into stuff’) does not fit at all comfortably with situations in 
which services sectors are not in the main slow-growing low-productivity 
areas of the economy, but in fast-growing sectors where per capita value-
added is relatively high, thus attracting resources to them (land, labour 
and capital) and having enough value-added to be part of a rapid growth 
outcome when they are producing – as they often are – half or more of 
GDP.9 As far as I can ascertain, how this happens has only been very 
                                                 
9  For economists, this metaphor clearly implies a state of continuous dynamic 
disequilibrium, in which factor prices vary between sectors, so resources move 
away from sectors where factor returns are low, so that the ‘law of one price’ 
does not hold.  
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weakly theorised, although Sheehan (2008) is a good start. In applying a 
model originally created to examine industrialisation, Sheehan (2008) 
stressed the importance of three factors: fixed costs in services, so that 
producers often experience falling unit costs as output increases; pecuni-
ary externalities, so that increased wages and employment in services 
stimulate demand for services output; and something of a ‘dual econo-
my’, so that wages in the services sector are ‘kept down’ by lower wages 
elsewhere, such as rural areas. 
Explanatory Narratives 
The economic history of Vietnam since the growth acceleration of the 
early 1990s is still to be written. A key issue is the role of policy, as a 
number of economic studies have argued that, despite heavy rhetoric 
from the CPV asserting the importance of their policy choices, the pat-
tern of change in the Vietnamese economy appears relatively uninflu-
enced by policy. Pham et al. (2008) concluded: 
The result from three national IO tables [give] strong support for 
the evolutionary movement of Vietnamese economy, or in our 
terminology, a bottom-up process, in which Doi Moi is a critical 
point [sic] marks the shift of Vietnamese economy from planned 
economy to marker oriented one. Hence, we could say integration 
in to [sic] the international market is inevitable and domestic final 
demand, through its impact of [sic] consumption, investment and 
export, play a vital role not only in the wealth of [sic] nation (gross 
output) but also in improvement of welfare (GDP). (Pham et al. 
2008: 33; Emphasis as in original) 
Giesecke and Tran (2008) studied the period from 1996 to 2003 and 
concluded: 
In our story, we find rapid growth in GDP to be due to produc-
tivity and labour force growth. […] Our results downplay policy 
reforms (such as the introduction of the VAT and reductions in 
trade taxes) as important explicators of rapid growth in trade and 
GDP. (Giesecke and Tran 2008: 26–27; emphasis added) 
Political scientists looking at the value to businesses of political connec-
tions have reached similar conclusions:10 
                                                 
10  As I mentioned, Gainsborough (2007) argued that politics had by the mid 
‘noughties’ ceased to have much to do with policy differences, and was instead 
about factional in-fighting and spoils. It is possible that a characteristic of Vi-
etnam’s contemporary political economy is that rents are not preserved, and are 
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[politically c]onnected firms are actually not very different from 
the rest of the private sector. They have very similar investment 
and profit levels and on average have seen similar levels of expan-
sion over the past year. Connected firms have slightly larger em-
ployment, but not much. (Malesky and Taussig 2009: 15) 
Counter-intuitively, the role of the state is not found to be so important 
here. Since Vietnam reached middle income status in 2009, however, 
experts have flagged various concerns. These include: 
 Weak development of value-added in higher technology sectors. 
 The problem of transition from extensive growth, linked often to 
the ’middle income trap’, where increased factor productivity is re-
quired to maintain growth. 
 How to continue with rapid growth in the face of poor public 
goods production; the Vietnamese press has long been full of sto-
ries about corruption and shortcomings in public education and 
health care. 
These issues require that ‘policy matters’; that, contrary to Gainsbor-
ough’s analysis, national sovereignty be deployed into the devising and 
implementation of policy. Gainsborough remarked that there is “always 
someone who can potentially stand in your way” (2007: 179). If we view 
the CPV as a ruling party very much influenced by Soviet thinking, then 
it was made quite clear in the USSR during the political reconstruction 
after the death of Stalin, as it was before, that national sovereignty lies 
with the Party. If there are severe problems with making policy matter, 
then, as Hinsley argued, this amounts to a classic instance of a situation 
where relations between rulers and ruled will be under pressure to 
change. As I have argued elsewhere, the central issue is the ‘Land with-
out a King’ phenomenon: the Party can rule hegemonically but it cannot 
govern, and policy cannot be deployed to the advantage of rulers and 
ruled alike (Fforde 2011, 2013). This comes down to a matter of domes-
tic sovereignty, which, as Hinsley (1986) argued some time ago, is better 
seen as a political concept rather than one deployed by political scientists:  
If we wish to explain why men have thought of power in terms of 
sovereignty we have but to explain why they have assumed that 
there was a final and absolute authority in their society – and why 
                                                                                                    
instead ‘switched’, dissipated through various channels. Corrupt state officials 
continue to manage organisations that receive state support, SOEs are protect-
ed and uncompetitive, public health and education are weak, etc. To ‘make pol-
icy matter’, political change is needed (as Leung argued).  
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they have not always done so […]. (Hinsley 1986: 1, and quoted in 
Fforde 2013: 8) 
The concept has been formulated when conditions have been 
emphasizing the interdependence between the political society and 
the more precise phenomenon of its government. It has been the 
source of greatest preoccupation and contention when conditions 
have been producing rapid changes in the scope of government or 
in the nature of society or in both. It has been resisted or reviled – 
it could not be overlooked – when conditions, by producing a 
close integration between society and government or else by pro-
ducing a gap between society and government, have inclined men 
to assume that government and community are identical or else to 
insist that they ought to be. In a word, the origin and history of 
the concept of sovereignty are closely linked with the nature, the 
origin and the history of the state. (Hinsley 1986: 2, and quoted in 
Fforde 2013: 16) 
This raises the question of what can be said usefully about such matters 
of “preoccupation and contention”, when the data suggests that Viet-
namese economic change – a major part of the country’s development 
process – is associated with a major contribution from services, and not 
that much from manufacturing industry.  
Contrasts between Actual Economic Change 
and Various Normative Views 
They All Thought It Was about Industrialisation (or That 
Is What They Said) 
In the 1990s there was considerable agreement amongst those providing 
advice and doctrinal options to the CPV that economic development 
was industrialisation. I think this had been true for the French, the US in 
South Vietnam before 1975, the USSR (which was the main source of 
economic assistance up until around 1991), and Western aid donors as 
they came in to Vietnam in greater numbers in the early 1990s. After all, 
the World Bank’s Economic Miracle study came out in 1993. We see this 
reflected in the two slogans of IM and SOME.  
The thorny aspect of policy advice in the 1990s is that it helped 
push the CPV into something of a political trap in encouraging support 
for the state sector, which by 1990 was the key hoped-for site of indus-
trialisation (Fforde 2007).  
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The political foundation of the Soviet development model (Fforde 
and Paine 1987) was the creation of state industry and SOEs, whose 
workers were given high priority and, at least in the early stages, whose 
managers very well paid compared to workers. Farmers were controlled 
through the cooperatives; as McAuley (1977) pointed out, this meant 
that the Party’s position vis-à-vis the two sectors was very different, as 
the plan’s control over SOEs gave SOEs a far closer relationship with 
political power than had farmers (McAuley 1977). Much of the history of 
the 1980s is to do with how SOEs – rather, the changing desires of the 
‘state business interest’ within the Party/State used this, along with mon-
ey created by market-based activities, to push the centre of gravity within 
the Party towards one that supported SOE commercialisation, marked 
by the U-turn of draft Decree 306-BBT in early 1986. Throughout the 
1980s, property rights generally moved down from planning organs, 
giving SOEs greater freedoms (Fforde 1993, 2007). In the 1990s, howev-
er, SOE freedoms declined as property rights moved back up, towards 
the cartels (tap doan) and various state structures (Fforde 2007).  
Once state business interests had gained such power, maintaining 
the Party’s position against ‘Anti-Party’ forces logically required the de-
velopment of policy to regulate and orient powerful economic actors; in 
other words, working through some hierarchy of ideas – strategy, tactics, 
programmes, etc. – that deployed the relative autonomy of the state and, 
in so doing, preserved the Party’s capacity to act. As mentioned, Gains-
borough argued that policy-based political action essentially no longer 
existed by the mid-‘noughties’. Indeed, one can treat the first of the three 
periods I outline above (ca. 1991 to ca. 1997) as a period in which resid-
ual authority flowed like sand between the CPV’s fingers and domestic 
sovereignty eroded. 
Thus, rather than being a period that securing some correct analysis 
of the emerging evidence for the relatively low importance of industry in 
the country’s growth path, the 1990s can be seen as a period in which 
support for the state sector – largely based upon investments in industry, 
as the Soviet model said – stymied strategic re-thinking. The World Bank, 
the most powerful of the new donors, did not help much.11  
                                                 
11  The focus of the Bank’s fundamental interests in lending rather than reform is 
shown by the tactical decision, taken in I think 1991, to abandon as its main 
counterpart the reformist Central Institute for Economic Management Re-
search (CIEM) in favour of the highly conservative State Planning Commission. 
At the time I was working in the Swedish development cooperation pro-
gramme and key Bank staff were well aware of the politics involved.  
  Vietnam: Economic Strategy and Economic Reality 19
 

 
The Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 
(CPRGS – 200212) supported donor agreement to a large World Bank 
lending programme, and public agreement between the Bank and its 
owners, and the Party on development strategy. To quote: 
The overall objective of Vietnam for the 2001-2010 period is to 
bring about a significant improvement in the people’s material, 
cultural and spiritual life, lay the foundations for the country’s in-
dustrialization and modernization, build a prosperous people, 
strong country and a just, equal, democratic and civilized society, 
and establish the institutions of a socialist-oriented market econ-
omy, protect and preserve the country’s natural resources and na-
tional culture for future generations. (GoV 2002: 6) 
Also:  
Slow industrialization and urbanization cannot attract redundant 
work forces. (GoV 2002: 15) 
And:  
The process of industrialization and urbanization has increased 
the inflow of unregistered migrants from rural areas, mainly those 
of working age and children. (GoV 2002: 20) 
The unthinking belief in industrialisation is epitomised by:  
To successfully achieve the […] objectives, the following tasks 
need to be well performed:  
Improve the system of legal institutions and policies and mecha-
nisms to make them suitable to the country’s industrialization and 
modernization. (GoV 2002: 53) 
Such thinking committed the Party, and its main donor partners, to a 
view of the nature of economic change that did not imply major changes 
in sectoral priorities, and thus weakened the Party’s ability to maintain 
distance from the drivers of change in the 1980s, commercialising 
SOEs.13  
                                                 
12  Thinking and associated knowledge production started perhaps five years 
earlier. 
13  Responsibility for this lies mainly with the World Bank. I was told by a JICA 
staff member in the mid ‘noughties’ that an early draft of the CPRGS included 
a footnote that this had been prepared on the request of the Bank (it was cer-
tainly in large part funded by it and its supportive bilateral donors), and that the 
Bank had “told the Vietnamese to take it out”.  
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Through the 1990s, some limited research suggested that SOEs ex-
perienced a reduction in their autonomy compared with the trends of the 
1980s (Fforde 2007). However, this change was not expressing any ra-
tional policy strategy because, as we know from some detailed reports to 
the National Assembly in the late ‘noughties’, regulatory authorities actu-
ally knew very little, in terms of reliable data, about SOEs. Without relia-
ble data, and the authority that can require it to be provided, the Party’s 
position appears, as Gainsborough described it, as a site for political 
conflicts over the division of spoils, so that policy and its logic cannot be 
deployed to deal with political issues.  
A National Assembly Study Team reported end of the ‘noughties’ 
on the state of policy towards SOEs (Study Team 2009). To quote 
Fforde (2009):  
[…] the opinion of the Study Team that the exercise of state sov-
ereignty through the state’s formal ownership rights over these 
businesses is – essentially – incoherent (the language is relatively 
diplomatic): 
“The division of tasks and responsibilities that realise the 
rights and duties of the state as owner, regarding Groups and 
General Companies are scattered and divided (phan tan, cat 
khuc). This leads to a situation where there is no organisation 
that bears principal responsibility for the management of capi-
tal and assets at [these units …] and no organ that bears prin-
cipal responsibility to monitor, analyse and evaluate deeply 
and in reality on the meeting of targets and responsibilities of 
regarding state ownership that are allocated to Groups and 
General Companies. Ministries and People Committees pretty 
much do not adequately grasp information on the activities of 
these units. The Ministry of Finance carries out state financial 
management but only participates indirectly in the manage-
ment of capital and assets via the reports of the Ministries and 
People’s Committees and of the units themselves” (Study 
Team 2009: 20). 
This supports the idea that, in any common-sense use of the term, 
these units, despite being nominally state-owned, holding vast as-
sets and being major contributors to the economy, are out of con-
trol. (Fforde 2009: 88) 
A rather exhaustive study of Vietnam’s SOEs concluded that SOEs are, 
in many ways, best seen as “virtual share companies”, responsive to the 
interests of those who control them in various ways (the “virtual share-
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holders”) rather than their formal owners (Fforde 2004, 2007, 2014). The 
trap for development policy in Vietnam, then, was that the state sector 
poses, and posed, two main problems.  
First, as such, the state sector was and is not an example of state 
property; rather, it is a form of private property, controlled by interests 
(not all interests) within the Party/State. As Greenfield wrote many years 
ago: 
There can be no doubt that the fiscal crisis of the state is im-
portant in this respect. But the reform of state sector enterprises 
has intensified rather than resolved this crisis. It is characterized 
by the private appropriation of public resources on a massive scale, 
where the state acts as the instrument of this appropriation. The 
dismantling of the “bureaucratic centralism and subsidy system” 
has concentrated power in the hands of incumbent state enter-
prise managers and the most powerful segments of the party-state 
bureaucracy […]. (Greenfield 1994: 206) 
Greenfield wrote from a ‘hard Left’ perspective, but his sources are im-
peccable and dove-tail well with later studies such as Angie Tran (2013). 
Leung (2015), quoted above and with a radically different perspective, 
agreed. The central issue here is the political and therefore developmen-
tal risks associated with a situation in which such elements of the Viet-
namese economy are deemed to have a privileged role. 
Second, the state sector and industrialisation was in many ways the 
‘child’ of both Soviet and World Bank development doctrines that, for 
quite different reasons, have lost their authority (the former due to the 
collapse of the USSR, the latter due to the evident fact that industrialisa-
tion is no longer a dominant part of the aggregate picture of economic 
change in developing countries). Therefore, under current doctrinal illu-
mination, industrialisation as ‘the’ development strategy appears anach-
ronistic. 
I now turn to the two slogans: IM and SOME.  
Industrialisation and Modernisation (IM)  
Some might imagine that a society whose economy is globalising rapidly 
and evolving fast towards a range of economic activities, of which ser-
vices seem to be dominant, would tend to not be well-suited to slogans. 
However, we find a continued use of conveyor-belt ideological work 
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centred upon the ideological department of the Party.14 It follows from 
this that references to IM are structured and specific. For example, in a 
statement from the Party’s newspaper Nhan Dan on its application to 
university education dated 19 August 2015,15 we find (after a statement 
about the slogan’s alleged universal meaning):  
In Vietnam, the 7th Plenum of the VIIth Party Central Committee 
(7/1994) approved the line (duong loi) of industrialising and mod-
ernising the country. Our Party laid down: in the process of de-
velopment of our country in accordance with a socialist direction, 
industrialisation and modernisation are means and formula to at-
tain the goal of a prosperous life that is daily better and better, for 
the liberation and all–round popular development […] [Section 1].  
Following the same line of research, what is clearly an on-line crib for 
examinations replies to the question “what is the theory (ly luan) of in-
dustrialisation and modernisation?” as follows:16 
The success of industrialisation and modernisation of the national 
economy is the definitive factor in the success of the road to so-
cialism that the Party and our people have chosen. Mainly because 
of this, industrialisation and modernisation of the national econ-
omy is viewed as the central task of the entire period of transition 
to socialism in our country […]. 
  
                                                 
14  Thus the formal job descriptions of the members of the 2016 Politburo in-
cludes, at # 8, inh Th Huynh - Trng ban Tuyên giáo Trung ng (Head of 
the Central Propaganda and Education Department). Details of its responsibili-
ties can be found online: <http://dangcongsan.vn/tu-lieu-van-kien/cac-ban-
dang-tw/doc-492220153253656.html> (9 March 2016). These include exami-
nation and approval (tham dinh) of all projects and documents related to the 
Party’s position (Chu truong) of Party, Mass Organisations, etc. before they are 
submitted to the Politburo [Section 2.2]. The same reference, from the VCP 
website, provides the Department’s internal structure.  
15  See <www.nhandan.com.vn/giaoduc/dien-dan/item/27199202-cong-nghiep-h 
oa-hien-dai-hoa-va-yeu-cau-doi-voi-giao-duc-dai-hoc-hien-nay.html> (9 March 
2016). 
16  See <www.wattpad.com/2927500-l%C3%BD-lu%E1%BA%ADn-v%E1%B 
B%81-c%C3%B4ng-nghi%E1%BB%87p-h%C3%B3a-hi%E1%BB%87n-%C 
4%91%E1%BA%A1i-h%C3%B3a-g%E1%BA%AFn-v%E1%BB%9Bi> (9 
March 2016). 
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So what is industrialisation and modernisation?  
The 7th plenum of the VIIth Central Committee issued the concep-
tion:  
Industrialisation and modernisation is a process of fundamental 
and all-rounded change of production, business, services and so-
cial and economic management from the predominant use of arti-
sanal labour to a predominant use of labour power17 with tech-
nology, methods and ways of working that are advanced, modern 
and rely upon the development of industry and scientific –
technical progress to create high labour productivity. 
So from a theoretical and practical view industrialisation and mod-
ernisation are a necessary historical process that Vietnam must go 
through change our country into an industrial country […] [1]. 
This strategic slogan appears, historically, to come from 1994, but is 
clearly little more than a repetition of earlier ideas. If we look at the 7th 
Plenum Resolution itself,18 Resolution # 7 discusses, close to the start, 
the concept in classic Marxist-Leninist terms, in Section 1 The state of 
industry, technology and the working class. Despite many successes:  
Industry, artisanal industry and technology in our country remain 
weak. By 1993 the proportion of industry only amounted to 20% 
of total national production and 11% of the workforce. Manufac-
turing and processing are a very small proportion. The capacity of 
industry to equip the national economy19 is still insignificant. […] 
The Vietnamese working class through our vanguard Party has led our 
revolution for more than half a century and is now once again tak-
ing the lead in the task of reform and industrialisation and mod-
ernisation [Section 1] 
Of course, the problem with this is that, taken to its logical conclusion, it 
would have to be concluded that the apparent economic success has 
been a failure, as industry’s share of GDP has (as examined above) fallen 
when mining is excluded; therefore, the economic growth processes 
cannot fairly be called ‘industrialisation’. This is.  
Nonetheless, what can be made of the concept of ‘modernisation’? 
Early uses of the term in official documents seem to reflect a simple idea 
                                                 
17  Sic. The term derives from Marx’s view that one hires out one’s labour power, 
not oneself, and is related to his view of the nature of commodities.  
18  See <http://dangcongsan.vn/tu-lieu-van-kien/van-kien-dang/nghi-quyet-bch-
trung-uong/khoa-vii/doc-2925201510081046.html> (9 March 2016). 
19  That is, to produce Group A industrial goods; see above.  
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of matching what is found in ‘developed’ countries, and the above-
mentioned Plenum Resolution offers no empirical referent beyond this.  
A Socialist-Oriented Market Economy (SOME) 
Origins 
This strategic slogan appears historically to link simply to Soviet devel-
opment doctrine, often known as Marxism–Leninism. In this schema, 
progress towards communism via socialism is gauged by the emergence 
and dominance of socialist “relations of production” (Stalin 1951). Since 
their progressive nature is shown by their (actual) dominance by the 
Party, the Party’s “leading role” is manifest in forms such as SOEs and 
collectives (cooperatives). As mentioned, Party leadership of SOEs is, in 
this schema, rather different from that of collectives. The former relies 
largely upon the state, while the latter relies upon the ability of local 
Party Committees and cells to control appointment to collectives’ man-
agements and to issue them with instructions that, in Leninist fashion, 
are to “concretise” general instructions coming from high levels. Decree 
# 10 of 1988 removed hundreds of thousands of cadre positions in rural 
areas when it, in effect, accepted a severe shrinkage in the scope and 
existence of cooperatives. Nowadays, this part of the “socialist econo-
my”, which also used to include other cooperatives in areas such as trade 
and light industry, still exists but has a very limited scope in the interests 
of Party organisations in implementing the Party’s “leading role”. For 
SOEs, in stark contrast, there remains a central Party “block” (khoi) of 
large SOE groups, each of which contains Party cells.20 However, as 
argued above, these are the facade of complicated relationships that do 
not amount to clear ownership, either in terms of the formal State regu-
lations or the actual powers of those sharing in commercial profits. 
  
                                                 
20  That is, those directly under the ‘bloc’; they each in turn had their own constit-
uent elements, usually SEs. Taken from <http://doanhnghieptrunguong.vn/> 
June 2014 – the Main Page of the site is entitled “The Party Committee of the 
Central Business Bloc” (“	
ng y khi doanh nghip trung ng”)” (Fforde 
2013: 37–38). 
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The Notion as Doctrine 
The same source cited above, which gives standard answers suitable for 
those taking tests on it, states:21  
The nature of a socialist-oriented market economy in our 
country:  
 It is not an economy managed according in the style of a 
centralized bureaucratic subsidised system 
 It is not a free market capitalist economy 
 It is not yet entirely a socialist-oriented economy. This is be-
cause our country is in the period of transition to socialism, 
and there is still a mixture of, and a struggle between, the old 
and the new, so there simultaneously are, and are not yet 
sufficiently, socialist factors [1]. 
It is reasonably obvious from this that central tensions are those between 
(1) the notion that it is market forces that should drive development, (2) 
the goal of such development being industrialisation and modernisation, 
and (3) the simple fact that after a generation of rapid and general popu-
lar use of a market economy and major economic change, the economy 
has not industrialised. The evidence from analysis of the state sector sug-
gests that the kernel of the matter is to be found there, and this is re-
flected in debates.  
Debates around the Concept 
To start with, it seems rather obvious that a regime that has not modern-
ised its political foundations faces the fascinating question of how to live 
with an apparent economic success that its core developmental slogans, 
reasonably interpreted, should deem a failure: Vietnam has not indus-
trialised. The ‘ghost in the argument’ here would seem to be that Party 
rule in fact does not, evidently, rely upon the state sector, that industriali-
sation and the state sector are clearly not driving development, that eco-
nomic growth has been fast, and that the state sector is not subject to 
coherent political control anyway.  
                                                 
21  See online: <www.wattpad.com/1068814-ch%C6%B0%C6%A1ng-13-kinh-t% 
E1%BA%BF-th%E1%BB%8B-tr%C6%B0%E1%BB%9Dng-%C4%91%E1% 
BB%8Bnh-h%C6%B0%E1%BB%9Bng-x%C3%A3-h%E1%BB%99i-ch%E 
1%BB%A7> (2 August 2016). 
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Reports in 2015 of the drafts of the political report to the January 
2016 XIIth Congress argued that a new definition of SOME was forth-
coming (Viet Ha 2015), and interviewed a leading Vietnamese reformist, 
Nguyen Quang A, who argued that there was not real change. However, 
in mid-February, after the XIIth Congress, Nguyen Thanh Tuan argued 
in the Party’s theoretical journal that there had been an easing of the 
concept’s leaning towards the state sector (Nguyen Thanh Tuan 2016).  
This interpretation is supported by the Political Report to the XIIth 
Congress, read there by the General Secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong (Ngu-
yen Phu Trong 2016). The report mentions the ‘leading role’ of the state 
sector only once (Section II), whilst the SOME is mentioned eight times. 
In an extended passage on the SOME (Section I) the emphasis is upon 
use of policy, legality, regulation, etc. and the “leading role” is not men-
tioned. However, IM is still seen as a sign of progress and is mentioned 
nine times. Production relations (quan h sn xut) are mentioned twice 
and not defined as the state and collective sectors.  
Conclusions 
It is useful to remember that the economic success of Vietnam since the 
early 1990s has been a surprise to many. Structural change away from 
agriculture but without industrialisation is even more unexpected. Also 
unexpected was the transition of the state sector away from the largely 
healthy processes of bottom-up commercialisation of the 1980s, which 
created the supply capacity that allowed Vietnam to first avoid negative 
output shock as Soviet aid was removed and then drive the first stages of 
rapid growth in the 1990s.  
Accommodation of foreign-invested businesses and an emergent 
registered private sector in the ‘noughties’, with macroeconomic stability 
until around 2007, suggests that the role of the widely unappreciated 
Nong Duc Manh (Party general secretary, 2001–2011) is as contradictory 
as that of the also widely unappreciated Le Duan (in office 1960–1986). 
After the fall of Le Kha Phieu in 2001, the next six years under Nong 
Duc Manh saw a consolidation of Vietnam’s service-oriented globalisa-
tion, fast growth of employment in manufacturing, and preparation for 
transition to middle income status in 2009. Throughout this period the 
Party required students and others, if they wanted high marks, to explain 
the validity and correctness of SOME and IM, when the reality increas-
ingly showed that poverty was falling quickly, the country was growing 
quickly, that industrialisation was not occurring, and it was a misnomer 
to call the state sector the ‘state’. If we take a step back, this is readily 
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seen as the stuff of a political community in motion, where economic 
success is an important part of the story.  
The XIIth Congress seems to show that lessons have been learnt. 
These are:  
1. It does not seem to matter what you call the animal, so long as it 
catches mice. The Vietnamese economy has been part of considera-
ble progress in the 25 years since a market economy clearly emerged. 
It is still not really clear why this happened, not least as services, and 
the way in which they fitted into the wider economy has not been 
studied to a great degree. Puzzlement never killed anybody. Now 
what?  
2. To feed, nurture and therefore catch more mice, perhaps at lower 
cost, policy needs to be made to matter and must also to be located 
within reasonably convincing narratives about what is happening, 
why it matters and what might be done about it. IM does not seem 
to be part of such narratives, but SOME does, especially if the old 
Marxist–Leninist references to “relations of production” and thus 
the rather odd justification for the “leading role of the state” are 
prevented from climbing in, making it harder for the CPV to get its 
act together and preserve its regime through policies the population 
like, such as reform of public health and public education. That 
would appear to be a more clever way of staying in power than go-
ing after dissidents and pressuring free trade unions.  
Finally, there is a clear need for further research into two areas. The first 
is to generate plausible explanations of patterns of change in the Viet-
namese economy since the early 1990s.The second is the sociology and 
politics of what seem to have been strong and likely misplaced beliefs in 
industrialisation, both in reality and normatively. For both, a decent 
literature survey is sorely needed.  
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